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The Canadian Armed Forces 
Advisory and Training Team 
Tanzania 1965-1970
Andrew B. Godefroy
At  th e  b e g in n in g  of th e  1 9 6 0 s  C a n a d a  em barked on an  increasingly interventionist 
policy  in  S o u th e rn  A frica th a t  in c lu d e d  a 
significant num ber of peacekeeping, military, and 
technical a ssis tan ce  p rogram m es1. In addition  
to peacekeeping efforts in the Congo (1960-64), 
C anada provided m ilitary assis tan ce  to G hana 
(1961-68), Zam bia (1965), T anzan ia  (1965-70) 
and  Nigeria (1963/ 1968-70). While the Zam bia 
and  Nigeria m issions were essentially responses 
to  e m erg en c ie s , th e  G h a n a  a n d  T a n z a n ia  
m issions were m ore calcu lated  affairs. To help 
foster dem ocratic governm ents C anada  agreed 
to a ss is t  in  the  es tab lish m en t an d  tra in ing  of 
professional arm ies and  air forces which, w hen 
com bined w ith governm ental a ssis tan ce  and  
o th e r in fra s tru c tu re  bu ild ing , w ould  firm ly 
su p p o rt a  pro-W estern ra th e r  th a n  com m unist 
regime in  the two countries. While the  m ission 
for G hana began  in 1961, the  C anad ian  Armed 
Forces Advisory an d  T rain ing  Team  T anzan ia  
(CAFATTT) w a s  o ff ic ia lly  a u th o r iz e d  on  
December 8th, 1964, after Prime M inister Lester 
B. Pearson made the announcem ent in the House 
of C om m ons. Over th e  n ex t five y ea rs  th e  
Canadian contingent built the Tanzanian People’s 
D efence Force (TPDF) from  the  g ro u n d  up , 
creating  everything from T an zan ia ’s National 
Defence Act to the instructional pam phlets used  
for teach ing  w eapons c lasses. T hroughout the 
CAFATTT m ission  bo th  R u ssian  and  Chinese 
advisory team s who were also com peting for 
T a n z a n ia  c o n t in u o u s ly  c h a l le n g e d  th e  
C anadians, initiating a gam e of Cold War chess 
w ith all of S o u th ern  Africa as  the  prize. In the 
en d , th e  C a n a d ia n s  w ere u n a b le  to sw ay
T anzan ia  tow ards the  w est and  were forced to 
leave only five years after they h ad  first arrived.
The Formation of Tanzania 1946-1964
Following the  end of the  Second World War G reat B rita in  re luc tan tly  agreed to place a 
num ber of its African protectorates under United 
N ations (UN) tru s teesh ip . In Tanganyika the 
B ritish  governm ent began  a slow tran s itio n  by 
encouraging  Africans to en te r the  civil service 
while h igher educated  Africans were positioned 
to eventually  take over various aspec ts  of the 
adm inistration. The move was designed to retain  
a  su b s ta n tia l voice for w hite E u ropeans and  
A sians in colonial politics while T anganyik ian  
Africans were confined to the developm ent of 
local in fra s tru c tu re . The B ritish  governm ent 
continued to control Tanganyikian m arkets and 
in  p a rticu la r its sisal p roduction  over w hich 
B ritain had  exclusive buying rights. B ritain was 
also the sole p u rc h a se r  of T anganyik ian  coffee 
a t a  fixed price though  th is  agreem ent ended  in 
1952. Overall, while publicly Britain h ad  agreed 
to encourage self-rule it h ad  in fact tak en  very 
few s tep s  in  th a t  direction.
In July  1954 the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) was created  u n d er the leadership 
of a well-educated political activist nam ed Ju liu s 
K. N yerere. TANU im m edia te ly  no tified  the  
Colonial Office an d  the  B ritish  au th o rities  th a t 
i ts  u l t im a te  a im  w a s  in d e p e n d e n c e  fo r 
Tanganyika. The governor, Sir Edw ard Twining, 
tried  to res tric t its activities an d  proh ib it the
©  C a n a d ia n  M ilita ry  H is to ry , V o lu m e 11, N u m b e r  3 , S u m m e r  2 0 0 2 , p p .3 1 -4 7 . 31
1
Godefroy: The CAF Advisory Training Team Tanzania 1965–1970
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002
p rin tin g  a n d  p u b lish in g  of m ate ria l or any  
assem bly  th a t  w as likely to raise  d iscon ten t 
am ongst the inhab itan ts  of the country. Despite 
these  efforts, by 1956 the  p a rty  h ad  registered 
over 100,000 m em bers. The following year the 
governm ent b an n ed  TANU in ten  d istric ts , b u t 
its m em bership still continued to grow. By 1960, 
TANU w as firmly rooted in  Tanganyika and  had  
gained enough influence to create the  political 
m om entum  needed to move tow ards an  African- 
led independence. The T anganyika election of 
A ugust 30 th , 1960, w as a  resound ing  success 
fo r TANU. R u n n in g  u n o p p o s e d  in  58  of 
Tanganyika’s 71 seats, the party  lost only one of 
the  rem ain ing  th irteen  ballots. Following the 
election Governor T urnbu ll appo in ted  Ju liu s  
Nyerere as  C hief M inister of the  C ouncil of 
M inisters, th e  first A frican to ever hold  the 
position.
In M arch 1961 a series of ta lk s  betw een 
Nyerere and  the British Colonial Secretary, Iain 
MacLeod, led to the  an n o u n cem en t th a t  full 
in te rn a l self-governm ent in  Tanganyika would 
begin on 15 May 1961. T hough Nyerere w as 
appointed Prime M inister of Tanganyika on this 
date, the  B ritish  Governor re ta ined  control of 
foreign affairs and the military until Tanganyika’s 
full independence on 9 D ecem ber 1961.
W hile T an g an y ik a  m a rc h ed  to w ard s its 
d ependence  so did its  offshore n e ighbou rs , 
Zanzibar and  Pemba. Socioeconomic and  ethnic 
d iv isions on the  two is la n d s  h a d  led to an  
increase  in  violence beginning  in  the  1950s. 
Arabs, Ind ians, Africans, and  white E uropeans 
all struggled  for control in  an  end less series of 
bloody c lashes. In 1954, a n u m b er of political 
groups emerged including the Arab Association, 
th e  A fro-Shirazi P a rty  (ASP), th e  Z an z ib a r 
N ational Party  (ZNP), a n d  the  Z anzibar and  
Pem ba People’s Party  (ZPPP). E ach  p a rty  h a d  a 
sim ilar platform  differing only in  term s of who 
would actually  ru le the islands.
In a general election held  in  J a n u a ry  1961, 
the  ZNP a n d  ZPPP w on equal v ictories and  
form ed a coalition governm ent th a t  included  a 
small num ber of m em bers from the ASP. Wanting 
to en su re  its own survival the ZNP se n t party  
m em bers ou t in to  the coun tryside  to take over 
ru ra l  a d m in is tra tio n s  while the  m ain lan d e r 
police force, Z anzibar’s m ost experienced and  
c o m p e te n t a u th o r i ty , w as d is m is s e d  a n d
rep laced  w ith  ZNP co n s ta b les . F inally , the  
governm ent an nounced  the  p rohib ition  of all 
other political parties, giving itself dictatorial rule 
over the islands.
Like Tanganyika, Zanzibar was also released 
from Colonial ru le and  becam e an  independen t 
s ta te  on 10 D ecem ber 1963. The ZNP/ZPPP 
con tinued  to hold power w ith a m ajority  of the 
sea ts , however the ASP h ad  in fact received the 
m ajority (54.3%) of the popu lar vote in  the  last 
e le c tio n . W ith in  a  few  w e e k s  th e  new ly  
independen t s ta te  fell into chaos, and  a bloody 
revolution in  J a n u a ry  1964 did away w ith the 
c o a litio n  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  th e  S u l ta n a te .  
Immediately following the revolt the Umma Party, 
a rad ica l e lem en t of th e  ZNP led by A bdul 
R ahm an M ohammed-Babu, and the more radical 
elem ents of the  ASP took political control and  
s te e re d  th e  is la n d  to w a rd s  a u n io n  w ith  
T a n g a n y ik a . Z a n z ib a r  a n d  P e m b a  jo in e d  
T anganyika on 26 April 1964, and  the  th ree 
te r r i to r ie s  fo rm ed  th e  U n ited  R ep u b lic  of 
Tanzania.
Canada and Military 
A ssistance to Tanzania
After the end of the Second World War military a s s i s ta n c e  e m e rg e d  a s  a n  im p o r ta n t  
in strum en t of international diplomacy employed 
by b o th  th e  E a s t a n d  th e  W est2. C an ad ian  
partic ipa tion  in  m ilitary assis tan ce  program s 
beg an  in  the  la te  1950s as  officials in  the  
D epartm en t of E xternal Affairs (DEA) realized 
the increasing  value of su ch  aid in  contribu ting  
to tow ards the  pro-dem ocratic  evolution of the 
developing world. While no t overly anx ious to 
divert scarce resources away from Europe, the 
decolonization and  expansion of the New British 
C o m m o n w e a lth  p ro v id e d  y e t a n o th e r  
opportun ity  for C anada to partic ipa te  in  p o s t­
w ar in ternational affairs3.
The rap id  d isin tegration  of E uropean  rule 
in  Central and  S outhern  Africa instantly  created 
a power vacuum  th a t  n e ither the Soviet Union 
or the United S tates was prepared to accept. For 
C anadian officials who naively hoped th a t Africa 
m ig h t  n o t  b e c o m e  a n o th e r  E a s t-W e s t  
b a ttle g ro u n d  th e re  w as a n  a rg u m e n t m ade 
tow ards cabinet th a t m ilitary assis tan ce  w ould 
bring  bo th  in te rn a l and  in te rnationa l stability
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Captain John P. Saunders, Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, assigned to the Canadian Military 
Training Team in Dar es Salaam, instructs Tanzanian soliders on the 82 mm mortar, 11 March 1967
to the  region. More realistically , it w as well 
accepted by both  W ashington and  Ottaw a th a t if 
the  West refused  to help new  African nations, 
they  m ight feel it necessary  to tu rn  tow ard the 
C om m unist bloc for a ssis tan ce .4
In  J u n e  1961 C a b in e t  a p p ro v e d  th e  
cond itions u n d e r  w hich  the  D ep a rtm en t of 
National Defence (DND) would accept as  p a rt of 
its  co m m itm en ts  th e  flexibility  to tra in  as 
requ ired  m ilitary personnel of Com m onw ealth 
countries.5 Almost immediately DND responded 
to req u es ts  for a ss is ta n c e  from  Nigeria and  
G hana, and  had  sen t a full tra in ing  team  to the 
la tte r country  by the end of the  year.
Unlike Nigeria and  G hana, the  first request 
m ad e  by T a n g a n y ik a  ( la te r  T a n z a n ia )  for 
C anad ian  m ilitary a ss is tan ce  m et w ith little 
success. Forw arded to DND in  April 1963, the 
inquiry  w as quickly tu rn e d  down by the  newly 
appoin ted  M inister of National Defence (MND), 
Pau l Hellyer. The MND h a d  ju s t  in itia ted  a 
com plete reorganization of DND and  refused to 
u n d e rtak e  any fu rth e r com m itm ents u n til the
job w as done.6 Hellyer’s s tu b b o rn n e ss  proved 
particu la rly  fru s tra tin g  for the D epartm en t of 
E x ternal Affairs as Prim e M inister Lester B. 
P earson  h a d  verbally  com m itted  C an ad a  to 
assis ting  Tanganyika du ring  P residen t Ju liu s  
Nyerere’s visit to O ttaw a in Ju ly  1963. H eated 
debate betw een DEA, DND, Finance, an d  the 
D e p a r tm e n t of D efence  P ro d u c tio n  (DDP) 
eventually led to a feasible so lu tion  w hereby all 
p a rties  pa rtic ip a ted  in  a n  in te rd ep artm en ta l 
Military A ssistance Committee (MAC) th a t would 
sh a re  control over budgets  an d  program s. The 
MAC determ ined  how requests  for aid would be 
fulfilled a n d  th e n  forw arded  p ro p o sa ls  and  
b u d g e t c o s ts  to th e  C ab ine t C om m ittee on 
E x te rn a l A ffairs a n d  D efence (CCEAD) for 
approval. With a  satisfactory m echanism  in place 
DEA w as able to renew  th e ir efforts to procure 
m ilitary assis tance  for T anzan ia .7
In A ugust 1964 a req u e s t for a m ilitary 
survey team  to T anzan ia  w as approved by the 
CCEAD an d  upon  receipt of the team ’s report 
a fte r  th e ir  r e tu r n  in  D ecem ber, a g e n e ra l 
p rogram  for C anad ian  m ilitary assis tan ce  w as
33
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a c c e p te d .8 S p e a k in g  la te r  in  th e  H ouse  of 
C om m ons, P rim e M in is te r  L e s te r P e a rso n  
stated:
It is a  so u rc e  of g re a t p e rs o n a l sa tis fa c tio n  to 
m e th a t  su ita b le  m e a n s  h av e  b e e n  fo u n d  for 
C a n a d a  to  co -o p era te  w ith  th e  U n ited  rep u b lic  
of T a n z a n ia  in  th e  deve lo p m en t of th e  defence  
a n d  in te rn a l s e c u r ity  fo rces of th a t  im p o rta n t 
m em b er of th e  C om m onw ealth . We re sp e c t th e  
d e s ire  of th e  T a n z a n ia n  g o v e rn m en t to  follow a 
policy  of n o n -a lig n m e n t, a n d  th e  p ro g ram m e 
w h ich  h a s  b een  ag reed  [to] in  p rinc ip le  be tw een  
o u r  tw o g o v e rn m en ts  is  in  no  w ay  in te n d e d  to 
in te rfe re  w ith  th a t  policy.9
The details of the  MAC p lan  for T anzan ia  
were straightforw ard . C anada  w as to deploy a 
team  of approxim ately 30 advisory and  train ing  
p e r s o n n e l  to  T a n z a n ia  to  a s s i s t  in  th e  
developm ent of the defence and  security  forces, 
an d  m ake places available for T anzan ians  in 
C anad ian  m ilitary estab lishm ents and  courses. 
In addition, the C anadian governm ent agreed in 
principle to assum e the foreign exchange costs 
of b u i ld in g  a  m ilita ry  t r a in in g  c e n te r  in  
T a n z a n ia .10 W hile th e  f irs t two ta s k s  w ere 
relatively easy to execute, the  m ission  to build  
the  T anzan ia  M ilitary Academy (TMA) proved 
m uch  m ore politically an d  financially  difficult 
for C anada to complete.
34
Tanzanian soldiers are taught how to use a generator tester 
by RCEME Sergeant John Rogers, 11 March 1967.
The D eploym ent o f CAFATTT
W'ith the decision finalized, DND tasked  the C anad ian  Forces H eadquarters (CFHQ) to 
provide the advisory group and  a train ing group 
for CAFATTT. The advisory group assignm en t 
w as a tw o-year accom panied  posting  a t the 
T a n z a n ia n  P eo p le ’s D efence Force (TPDF) 
h e a d q u a r te rs  in  D ar es S a laam , w hile the  
tra in in g  g roup  a ss ig n m e n t w as a  one-year 
unaccom panied  posting a t Colito B arracks ju s t  
ou tside  of the  T an zan ian  cap ita l (see map). 
CFHQ selected Colonel H.E.C. Price, C anad ian  
G uards, to lead the  first th irty  m an  team  to 
Tanzania, with Lieutenant-Colonel J.C . G ardner 
of the  Fort G arry Horse as  h is sen ior tra in ing  
advisor.11 An advance party  consisting of Colonel 
Price, M ajor A.M. P o tts , P rin cess  P a tric ia ’s 
C anad ian  Light Infantry  (PPCLI), and  Sergeant 
P.L. M agalos, H e a d q u a r te rs  (HQ) W este rn  
Com m and, arrived in Dar es Salaam  in Ja n u a ry  
1965 to es tab lish  con tac t w ith the  TPDF and  
p repare  for the  arrival of the  re s t of the  team .
At f ir s t  th e  ta s k  m u s t  h av e  a p p e a re d  
im possible. The TPDF w as in a  decrepit sta te , 
disorganized, scattered, and  rife with corruption 
especially w ith in  its officer corps. The order of 
battle  boasted  only two u n d er streng th  infantry 
b a tta lions  an d  a sm all h e a d q u arte rs  a t D ar es 
Salaam , a total of 53 officers and  2 ,000  m en, of 
whom  a th o u sa n d  were recru its . In 1964, the 
arm y h a d  m utin ied  over issu es  of service and  
p a y , a n d  th e  T a n z a n ia n  g o v e rn m e n t  
em barrassingly required the aid of British forces 
to p u t down the  revolt and  resto re  order. In the 
end  th e  TPDF w ere g ra n te d  m any  of th e ir  
dem ands and  the force was reorganized, though 
th is allowed only some veteran soldiers to benefit 
while the  m ajority  of the  arm y w as left to ru in .
The advisory group w orked w ith Brigadier 
General M. S. H. Sarakikya, the Tanzanian Chief 
of D efence  F o rces  (CDF) to  e s ta b l is h  th e  
fo u n d a tio n s  of w h a t w ould  becom e a new  
military, while the training group prepared Colito 
B arracks to serve as the  tem porary  m ilitary 
academ y u n til the  p e rm an en t academ y w as 
com pleted  a t A rusha . Colonel Price quickly 
discovered th a t there was m uch work to be done. 
The TPDF h a d  no National Defence Act (NDA), 
no m ilitary legal or logistics system , an d  no
adm inistrative capability. There were no service 
records for soldiers nor any system  to regulate 
a n d  verify  p ay . N ot a s in g le  q u a lif ie d  or 
experienced staff officer could be found in  the 
Defence Force H eadquarters (DFHQ), and  there 
was not even a clerical staff to handle typing and 
filing. Everything had  to be built up  from scratch.
The tra in in g  g roup  experienced  s im ila r 
challenges. The TPDF had  no recognized training 
s tan d ard s  or system , and  there were no training 
aids or in structiona l pam phle ts  for any of the 
trades. The TPDF employed a variety of weapons 
an d  equ ipm ent from half a dozen w estern  and  
e aste rn  bloc coun tries, though  the  m ajority  of 
m ateria l w as of C hinese origin. W ithout any 
existing p ersonnel adm in istra tive  system  at 
DFHQ, it w as im possible to determ ine who had  
been  tra ined  to w hat level.
The Tanzania Military Academy w as initially 
organized into five wings w ith a  staff of 250 
personnel, including 18 C anadians. Each w ing - 
adm inistrative, basic  train ing, officer train ing, 
ba tta lion  train ing, and  technical tra in ing  - was 
overseen by two C anadian m em bers assisted  by 
a sm all nu m b er of recently  tra ined  T anzan ian  
officers a n d  so ld ie rs . The objective w as to 
provide direction while TPDF in s tru c to rs  were 
trained after which the C anadian positions could 
gradually be eliminated. From May to December 
1965 , 21 c o u rs e s  w ere c o n d u c te d  in  five 
professional advancem ent fields and  six trades, 
resulting in 232 graduates by the end of the first 
year of operation. Triple the num bers of studen ts 
w as expected the following year.12
B ecause of the trop ical clim ate the  TMA 
began  operations daily a t 0730 hours, breaking 
for lunch  a t 1200 h o u rs  and  ending c lasses a t 
1500 hours. D uring the  cooler seasons th is  left 
a few h o u rs  for physical tra in ing  before supper, 
b u t  during  the T anzan ia  sum m er few ven tured  
outside for physical activity before 1630 hours. 
A fter h o u rs  th e  s tu d e n ts  a n d  s ta f f  fo u n d  
recreation in squash , golf, sailing, and  deep-sea 
fishing, as well as m esses for bo th  the  officers 
an d  m en a t Colito B arrack s.13 The CAFATTT 
personnel were garrisoned either a t the officer’s 
m ess or in  fu rn ished  housing  in  D ar es Salaam  
u n t i l  m o re  p e r m a n e n t  q u a r t e r s  w ere  
constructed.
Add the Air Force
A n u m b e r  of c o u n tr ie s  h a d  re sp o n d e d  to T a n z a n ia n  r e q u e s t s  fo r m il ita ry  a n d  
technical assis tance , including West Germ any, 
w hich h a d  tak en  on the ta sk  of developing the 
coun try ’s a ir force.14 In 1964, the  West G erm an 
governm ent pro tested  Ju liu s  Nyerere’s decision 
to allow a n  E a s t G erm an consu la te  in  D ar es 
S a laa m  a n d  th re a te n e d  to te rm in a te  th e ir  
m ilitary an d  technical aid. D eclaring th a t  no 
coun try  w ould decide T anzan ia’s friends and  
enem ies, Nyerere directed the West G erm ans to 
remove all of their advisors from the  coun try  
and  cancel no t only their m ilitary and  technical 
a ssis tan ce  b u t also th e ir econom ic aid as  well. 
While politically impressive the decision was not 
particularly  astu te , and  the sudden  cessation of 
West G erm an assistance left T anzania’s air force 
in a precarious state. As Canada had  ju s t recently 
comm itted itself to training the Tanzanian army, 
N yerere exp lored  th e  p o ss ib ility  of O ttaw a 
assisting  w ith the developm ent of its airforce as 
well. On 6 April 1965, O ttaw a announced  th a t it 
h a d  ag reed  in  p rin c ip le  to m ee t a fu r th e r  
Tanzanian request for military support, th is time 
in the  estab lishm en t of a  m ilitary a ir wing.
C a n a d a  d isp a tc h e d  a n  a ir  su rvey  team  
consisting of two officers, G roup C aptain  (G/C) 
G.H. Currie, an d  S q u ad ro n  Leader (S/L) H.L. 
M cC orm ick, a n d  one a d m in is tra tiv e  clerk , 
S e rgean t J . R. B outin  to T anzan ia , while a 
num ber of Tanzanian air wing personnel traveled 
to C anada  to begin the ir tra in ing . Upon h is 
re tu rn  to O ttaw a, G /C  C urrie  reported  th a t  
T anzania required  considerable equipm ent and 
train ing  assis tance  in order to achieve a m odest 
a ir - tra n sp o rt an d  liaison capability  w ith in  the 
next five years. From  the  field report the  MAC 
form ulated  a detailed  a ss is tan ce  proposal th a t 
w as read ily  accep ted  by T an zan ia . O ttaw a 
publicly announced  on 3 Septem ber 1965, th a t 
C anada w ould donate  u p  to four C aribou and  
eight O tter aircraft an d  a ss is t w ith the tra in ing  
of up  to 400  T anzan ian  aircrew , ground  crew, 
an d  su p p o rt personnel. Half of these  w ould be 
tra ined  in C anada while the o ther ha lf would be 
tra ined  in T anzan ia .15
Like the  arm y, the  T anzan ian  air wing h ad  
to be built up  from nothing. The study conducted 
by the  CAFATTT a ir  w ing in  O ctober 1965
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confirm ed th a t  T anzan ia  lacked any so rt of air 
control system , ground control facilities, supply 
s y s te m , o r s to c k  c o n tro l .  P ilo ts  n e e d e d  
conversion tra in ing  on bo th  the  C aribou and  
O tter aircraft, and  technicians h ad  to be taugh t 
how to service them. Based on this situation G /C  
Currie and  his advisory staff produced a  notional 
a ir wing estab lishm en t for Tanzania, a five-year 
developm ent plan, an d  a  budget. The CAFATTT 
a ir  w in g  a lso  r e c r u i te d  m o re  T a n z a n ia n  
personnel to come to C anada  to jo in  the  five 
T anzanian  officers who h ad  already reported for 
flying and  technical in struction  in  Ju n e  1965.16
In J a n u a ry  1966 the  first six teen  RCAF 
personnel arrived a t D ar es S alaam  u n d e r the 
com m and of S /L  I. K. MacKenzie to establish  air 
o p e ra tio n s  a n d  tra in in g  facilities. The firs t 
p r io ritie s  w ere th e  in itia tio n  of conversion  
tra in ing  for pilots an d  g round  crew  an d  the 
bu ild ing  of the  facilities requ ired  for a self- 
suppo rting  air wing. The construc tion  a t the 
airfield proceeded slowly u n til the  Britoria oil 
lift to Zam bia ceased  operations a t the  end  of 
May 1966, th u s  elim inating the  congestion in 
the  a ir w ing o p era tio n s  a rea . The first two 
donated  C aribou a ircraft spo rting  T anzan ian  
m arkings arrived from Nairobi on May 19th, 
1966, flown in on the  la s t leg by newly tra ined  
T anzanian  pilots. After a perfect landing the two 
a ircraft were h an d ed  over in  a  well-publicized 
cerem ony to officially m ark  th e  c rea tio n  of 
T anzania’s airforce.17
The Naval D ilem m a
W'ith  the developm ent of T anzan ia’s a ir and  g ro u n d  forces well u n d e r  way, J u l iu s  
N yerere n ex t tu rn e d  h is  a tte n tio n  tow ards 
b u ild in g  a navy . Not w a n tin g  to give th e  
C om m unists  any  chance  to exploit a newly 
opened  door, the  U nited  S ta te s  qu ietly  b u t 
q u ic k ly  r e q u e s te d  th a t  C a n a d a  in s t r u c t  
CAFATTT to deter the Tanzanians from building 
a naval force a t all. Colonel Price h a d  already 
m a d e  th is  re c o m m e n d a tio n  to  B r ig a d ie r  
Sarakikya, arguing th a t  m anning  a navy would 
d ra in  scarce h u m an  resou rces from  the arm y 
an d  a ir wing. However w hen  the  T anzan ian  
P resid en t p e rs is te d  in  advancing  the  issue , 
B rigadier Sarak ikya  w as left w ith little choice 
b u t to ad d ress  the  m atte r  seriously. The naval 
dilem m a th a t  followed becam e the  first of a
series of Cold War chess m atches played ou t by 
CAFATTT during  its tenu re  in S o u th ern  Africa.
An initial suggestion th a t  the  B ritish  tra in  
the  T anzan ian  navy w as prom ptly refused  by 
P resident Ju liu s  Nyerere, who w as a t the tim e 
officially opposing B ritish  econom ic sanctions 
against the recently self-independent Rhodesia 
th a t h a d  in  tu rn  begun  to cripple o ther so u th  
African econom ies as well.18 However, a B ritish  
naval officer had already been tasked to complete 
a n  a s s e s s m e n t  fo r T a n z a n ia ’s n a v a l  
req u irem en ts  in early  1966, an d  h is  rep o rt 
becam e th e  b a s is  for s u b s e q u e n t offers of 
w estern  a ss is ta n c e .19 The officer had  estim ated  
th a t  th e  in itia l  re q u ire m e n t for a c o a s ta l 
m aritim e patro l force was 240 officers and  m en 
m ann ing  th ree  patro l craft. With the  necessary  
shore  in sta lla tions the  cost w as estim ated  at 
£ 3 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0  p lu s  £ 2 8 9 ,2 0 0  a n n u a l ly  fo r 
operations and m aintenance. Realizing th a t given 
the political s itu a tio n  su rro u n d in g  Rhodesia it 
seem ed unlikely  th a t B rita in  w ould spearhead  
the effort, o ther w estern European  nations were 
canvassed for support. Of the few who agreed to 
consider the idea, only the N etherlands gave the 
proposal any serious consideration, b u t  they 
soon declined as well.20
A confidential m essage to Ottawa on 14 Ju n e  
1966, inform ed E x ternal Affairs th a t  w ith in  
tw enty-four h o u rs  of the  D u tch  refu sa l the  
C hinese am b assad o r in  the  Hague h ad  called 
on the T anzan ian  am bassador, Mr. Ngaiza, and  
inform ed him  th a t C hina would be p leased  to 
train  the Tanzanians and meet all costs including 
the supp lem en t of naval vessels.21
The door h ad  suddenly sw ung wide open for 
Chinese competition. Within four days the State 
D epartm en t of the  U nited S ta tes  responded  by 
a ttem pting  to p e rsu ad e  the D u tch  governm ent 
to reverse its decision, and  h a d  se n t a  secret 
m essage to Ottaw a asking for C anadian support 
in  th e ir  efforts. The A m ericans were clearly 
concerned abou t increased  C hinese activity in 
the w estern Indian Ocean, especially so near the 
U.S. meteorological and  research  installation at 
Aldabra. Additionally, Chinese naval assistance 
to T anzan ia  could have led to the  ju stifica tion  
for the  es tab lish m en t of shore  facilities and  
com m unications insta lla tions, and  the sudden  
increased presence of two hundred  plus Chinese 
m ilitary advisors would alm ost certain ly  have
36
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jeopardized the w estern  position  in  the Indian 
Ocean area.22
D espite fu rth e r efforts by W ashington to 
encourage the  D utch  to change their position, 
by Septem ber 1966 the issue  w as closed. The 
decision left the American State D epartm ent with 
only C anada as an  im m ediate influence against 
T a n z a n ia  se e k in g  a id  from  a C o m m u n is t 
country: there  w as good reason  to su sp ec t th a t 
the  Soviets h ad  done the  sam e. T anzan ia  had  
been improving its relationship with China since 
i ts  in d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  c lea rly  W ash in g to n  
perceived th is  as a strateg ic th rea t. P resident 
Nyerere eventually  decided to postpone acting
on the C hinese naval offer, and  Colonel Price 
suspec ted  th a t p e rh ap s he w as waiting to see if 
the  Soviet Union w ould s tep  forw ard w ith a 
b e tte r  offer still.23 There w as no d oub t in  h is 
m ind th a t the outcome would be of great in terest 
to Washington.
Developing Command and 
Control o f the TPDF
D espite reform  in the TPDF there  con tinued  a  s e r io u s  defic iency  in  c o m m an d  a n d  
control of the  arm y. Few, if any, of the  TPDF 
se n io r  le a d e rs h ip  h a d  a n y  re a l c o m m an d
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experience, an d  s ta ff  ab ilities w ere en tirely  
absent from both the headquarters and the army. 
R e a liz in g  th is  to  be th e  ly n c h p in  in  th e  
developm ent of the arm y, Colonel Price with the 
su p p o rt of B rigadier S arak ikya  in itia ted  the 
TPDF sen ior officers s tu d y  group th a t  becam e 
an  annual event. Attended by senior officers from 
the  th ree  TPDF in fan try  ba tta lions  p lu s  a few 
representing the headquarte rs  and  the air wing, 
the  first w eek long w ork shop  in  1966 w as 
designed to brief the  sen io r leadersh ip  on the 
p rogress of the  TPDF developm ent, to d iscuss 
fu tu re  p lan s  for o rganization , tra in ing , an d  
operations, and to study  the principles of tactical 
em ploym en t in  p re p a ra tio n  for th e  a n n u a l 
collective tra in in g  period  a t M onduli in  the  
au tum n. Well attended, the only disappointm ent 
w as th a t  the  two officers invited from  Zanzibar 
fa iled  to  a rr iv e  a t  th e  w o rk sh o p , a n d  no 
exp lanation  for th e ir  absence  w as provided. 
However it becam e increasingly  obvious to the 
C anad ians th a t  a gap w as form ing betw een the 
m ainland force and  those stationed on Zanzibar, 
where Com m unist advisors had  taken  the lead.24
The sh o rt tra in ing  session  highlighted the 
obvious w eaknesses in the TPDF command. Map 
reading and  battle  procedure skills am ongst the 
TPD F o ff ic e rs  w ere  v e ry  po o r, a n d  th e y  
dem onstrated considerable difficulties in solving 
tactical problem s above the platoon level.25 This 
w as u n d e rs ta n d a b le  to Col. P rice a n d  h is  
advisors, as m any of the older poorly qualified 
officers w ere com m issioned  a fte r  th e  1964 
m utiny  and  the  new er C anad ian  tra ined  TPDF 
officers had  never deployed more th an  a handful 
of soldiers in any operation. M eanwhile, those 
th a t had  been sen t for officer training in E astern  
Bloc or A sian coun tries  h ad  dem onstra ted  no 
skills. The problem  lay in the obvious differences 
in tra in ing  th a t  each  group h ad  received. While 
those T anzan ians se n t to C anada for officer 
tra in ing  were sim ply incorporated  into existing 
regular officer candidate training courses, those 
sen t to R ussia, the United Arab Republic (UAR), 
an d  Indonesia  h a d  received special courses 
designed for foreign nationals. Upon re tu rn in g  
from R ussia  an d  the  UAR the  TPDF officers 
tu rn ed  in course reports showing th a t they had
The Tanzanian People’s Defence Force received weapons from many sources, though the training was often lacking. In 
many cases the Canadian instructors had to teach themselves how to use the weapons before instructing their Tanzanian 
students. Here, Sergeant Robert Smith relates the finer points of using a Communist-bloc 12.7 mm heavy machine gun.
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qualified as batta lion  com m anders, while those 
re tu rn in g  from  In d o n e s ia  w ere g rac io u s ly  
q u a l i f ie d  a s  ‘g e n e r a l s ’. T h e  CAFATTT 
com m ander suggested  ru n n in g  all re tu rn in g  
officers th rough a  jun io r officer refresher course 
in Ju ly  1966 before deploym ent to Monduli, and 
Brigadier Sarakikya agreed. Of those attending, 
a lm ost all of the  E as te rn  Bloc tra ined  officers 
failed and  h ad  to be re -tau g h t over the sum m er 
by CAFATTT in s tru c to rs .26
Field Training at Monduli
In  the  a u tu m n  of 1966 th ree  b a tta lions  of the TPDF in fan try  traveled to M onduli for their 
first full-scale field exercise. Up to th is  point 
none of the  u n its  h a d  ever opera ted  a field 
com m and post, an d  very few of the  troops had  
ever fired th e ir w eapons or lived in  the  field for 
a pro tracted  period. The aim  of the exercise was 
to evaluate the individual training th a t the TPDF 
h ad  received to date, an d  to see w hether they 
could operate u p  to the  ba tta lion  level. U nder 
the  w atchful eye of the ir C anad ian  advisors, 
T a n z a n ia n  so ld ie rs  w ere e v a lu a te d  on  the  
operation  of a ba tta lion  h ead q u arte rs , on the 
conduct of offensive, defensive, an d  in te rnal 
security  operations, an d  on the  u se  of su p p o rt 
w eapons in  su p p o rt of ba tta lion  su b -u n its .27
Beginning w ith the  3 rd  B attalion  TPDF on 
Septem ber 3rd, 1966, each  u n it w as evaluated  
by L ie u ten an t Colonel S. F. A ndrunyk , the  
CAFATTT senior tra in ing  advisor.28 D uring the 
first week each battalion conducted basic routine 
and  individual skills train ing to get prepared  for 
m ore complex operations. D uring the  second 
w eek LCol. A ndrunyk  co n d u c ted  a T actical 
Exercise(s) W ithout T roops (TEWT) w ith the 
officers, while M ajor K. L. Mollison an d  Major 
J .  W. C u m m in g s  su p e rv is e d  a  c o n tro lle d  
com pany level exercise (EXTAYARISHA).29 LCol. 
A ndrunyk also tested  the TPDF officers on their 
battle procedure and  fire planning, while Majors 
M o lliso n  a n d  C u m m in g s  r a n  th e  TPD F 
c o m p a n ie s  th ro u g h  a s e r ie s  of d e fen s iv e  
positions and  a m b u sh  drills. Additionally, the 
soldiers prac ticed  firing the ir 82m m  m ortars  
with a  limited degree of skill and  success. During 
the  final week of tra in ing  the  CAFATTT officers 
c o n d u c te d  EX NGUVU MOJA, a  th re e -d a y  
ba tta lion  sized cordon an d  sweep of a  guerilla 
infested area. While conducting the operation the
TPDF battalion was “attacked” and  had to m ount 
an  effective counter-attack  against the CAFATTT 
enem y force.
The field exercise h ighlighted a  n u m b er of 
a reas  w here fu rth e r tra in ing  w as still needed. 
O verall, th e  co m m a n d  a n d  co n tro l of th e  
b a tta lion  w as w eak as none of the  officers h ad  
any experience in  operating  a tactical HQ. The 
h ead q u arte rs  w as seriously  lacking in  su p p o rt 
staff an d  few of the  officers h a d  staff tra in ing  of 
any sort. The battalion intelligence sections were 
not trained a t all prior to their arrival a t Monduli, 
an d  the  Intelligence Officers (IO) were m ore 
concerned  w ith secu rity  m atte rs  in  th e ir hom e 
sta tions th a n  w ith operational intelligence. This 
was understandab le  considering th a t in the past 
hom e s ta tio n  secu rity  h a d  been  th e ir prim ary  
function. The CAFATTT advisor recom m ended 
th a t  in  the  fu tu re  the  ba tta lio n  shou ld  create a 
field secu rity  section  for opera tions an d  leave 
the  rem aining intelligence staff a t hom e.30
Personal shortcom ings and  frustrations with 
co m m a n d  w ere fu r th e r  a g g ra v a te d  by th e  
criticism s of L ieu tenan t Colonel Ali M afude, 
second in com m and of TPDF forces in Zanzibar, 
who h ad  accom panied several Zanzibar officers 
a n d  N on-C om m issioned  O fficers (NCOs) to 
observe the field training a t Monduli. L ieutenant 
Colonel M afude h ad  received h is  m ilitary and  
political tra in ing  a t the  h a n d s  of Soviet and  
Chinese advisors, who had  obviously encouraged 
him  to speak  o u t aga in st any system  or tactics 
th a t the C anadians had  in troduced to the TPDF. 
The p resence of M afude an d  h is en tourage h ad  
becom e so annoying du ring  the  first week of 
tra in ing  th a t  the com m anding officer of the 3rd 
B attalion TPDF, L ieu tenan t Colonel M usuguri, 
m ade a form al req u es t to L ieu tenan t Colonel 
A ndrunyk th a t they  be removed from the camp, 
and by force if necessary. Andrunyk immediately 
con tac ted  the  Chief of the  Defence Staff on the 
m a tte r , a n d  w ith in  a few h o u rs  B rig ad ie r 
Sarakikya h ad  arrived an d  collected the  group. 
Mafude and  his fellow officers were im m ediately 
re tu rned  to Zanzibar town on Sarakikya’s re tu rn  
flight, leaving the CAFATTT team  to ca n y  on with 
train ing un in te rru p ted .31
The field  t ra in in g  a t  M ondu li in  1966 
revealed th a t  all ran k s  of the  TPDF suffered a 
n u m b er of difficulties. There w as in  general a 
poor knowledge of su p p o rt w eapons and  the
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TPDF soldiers h ad  not been  tau g h t ind irect fire 
m ethods. This cam e as som ething of a su rp rise  
to the  CAFATTT in s tru c to rs  a s  th e  C hinese 
advisors h a d  supposed ly  tra ined  the  TPDF on 
all su p p o rt w eapons th a t  th e ir  coun try  h a d  
provided. Noting th a t there were no teaching aids 
for th e  C h in ese  w eap o n s , a co u p le  of th e  
C a n a d ia n  NCOs ta u g h t th em se lv es  how  to 
employ bo th  the  82m m  m orta r an d  the  7.62 
M edium  M achine G uns effectively, and  then  
wrote tra in ing  guides th a t  were la te r u sed  to 
te a c h  TPD F s o ld ie rs . A n o th e r  s u rp r is in g  
w eakness was driving skills, in particu lar cross­
coun try  driving. Again the  C anad ian  soldiers 
learned  to m aste r the  C hinese vehicles before 
p assin g  a n u m b er of TPDF soldiers th ro u g h  a 
m ake-sh ift driver’s course.
In general TPDF battle skills were also weak. 
Protection on the battlefield was poor and  u n its  
were re lu c tan t to employ reconnaissance forces 
an d  fighting patro ls. In som e cases, C anad ian  
advisors noted th a t TPDF stand ing  patrols were 
p o s itio n ed  too close to the  m ain  defensive 
position yet w ithout com m unications to w arn of 
an  im pending attack .32 It was realized th a t these 
traits were typical of a force used  to dealing more 
w ith  in te rn a l  se c u r ity  an d  n o t sovere ign ty  
defence. However, the  TPDF troops perform ed 
well du ring  the  cordon and  sweep exercise, a 
m aneuver they  h a d  h ad  m ore experience in 
executing. Overall, L ieutenant Colonel Andrunyk 
was satisfied tha t m any lessons had  been learned 
a t M onduli an d  th a t  the  capability  of the  TPDF 
arm y w as slowly improving.
Enter the Dragon
In mid 1966 the Chinese began to augm ent their physical p resence  in  T anzan ia  an d  openly 
challenged C anadian dom inance in the country’s 
m ilitary an d  technical a ssis tan ce  program s. In 
J u ly  Colonel Price rep o rted  to O ttaw a th a t  
coincident w ith the p repara tion  of the  1966-67 
T a n z a n ia  d e fe n c e  b u d g e t  w a s  th e  
recom m endation  th a t  the  TPDF acquire bo th  
ta n k s  a n d  a rtille ry . It w as a rg u e d  by  the  
Tanzanian Second Vice-President th a t both were 
required for suppressing  potential riots or o ther 
possible trouble in the capital of D ar es Salaam , 
an d  th a t  the Chinese h ad  graciously offered to 
s u p p ly  ta n k s ,  a r t i l le ry , a n d  t r a in in g  for 
Tanzanian crews. It was difficult for Colonel Price
to ju stify  the tab ling  of the  issue  for the  tim e 
being, b u t he m anaged to do so. On August 15th. 
DND re c e iv e d  a n o th e r  c o n f id e n tia l  
m em orandum  from  D epartm en t of E x ternal 
Affairs via W ashington stating th a t 12 large truck 
tan k e rs  an d  a  q u an tity  of un identified  heavy 
equ ipm ent h a d  been  delivered to the Island  of 
Zanzibar by the Chinese navy. Furtherm ore the 
m essage noted th a t four C ubans had  also arrived 
on the island  via the Chinese, possibly to tra in  
lo c a l  r e v o lu t io n a r ie s  fo r f ig h t in g  in  
M ozam bique.33 While su ch  activity did no t yet 
th re a te n  C a n a d a ’s p resen ce  in  T an zan ia  it 
certa in ly  u n d e rm in ed  the  om nipotence th a t  
CAFATTT had  enjoyed th u s  far.
The C hinese increased  th e ir influence in 
o ther ways as well. The increasing  n u m b er of 
C hinese w eapons being incorporated  into the 
TPDF led the  CAFATTT com m ander to advise 
the CDF th a t in the in terests of standardization, 
o ther types of w eapons shou ld  be w ithdraw n in 
favour of Chinese equipm ent, of which there was 
sufficient am ount to equip the infantry battalions 
an d  the  TMA. B rigadier S arak ikya agreed in 
principle, however he rem inded Colonel Price 
th a t  the  p lan  w as no t politically acceptable as 
the Soviets m ight be offended if the weapons they 
provided were discarded. One could not dism iss 
the irony of the CAFATTT com m ander promoting 
the position  of h is m ain  adversary, however for 
the m om ent the issue  also w ent unreso lved .34 
W hat w as certain  w as th a t a dichotom y of effort 
was evolving in the TPDF development p lan  with 
CAFATTT on one side and  the C hinese on the 
other.
To se rv ice  th e ir  w e a p o n s  th e  C h in e se  
a d v iso rs  e s ta b l is h e d  a sm a ll a rm s  re p a ir  
w orkshop a t Colito B arracks th a t  em ployed 
fo u r te e n  P e o p le ’s L ib e ra tio n  A rm y (PLA) 
soldiers. The group avoided any contact with the 
C anad ians, an d  w hen the  two did m eet there  
w ere no exchanges of p lea san trie s . D espite 
w hatever official m u tua l good will was enforced 
upon  the  two groups by Ju liu s  Nyerere bo th  
p a rties  knew  the  true  reaso n s for each  o th er’s 
p resence  in  T anzania, and  bo th  in tended  to 
win.35
A n u m b er of R u ssian  an d  Chinese vehicles 
h a d  also been  donated  to the  TPDF, yet unlike 
th e i r  w e a p o n s  th e  v e h ic le s  w ere  se ld o m  
serv iceab le . Tw enty-five BTR-60 A rm oured
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Sergeant Robert Craig, PPCLI, trains soldiers from the 
TPDF on the 75 mm recoiless rifle.
Personnel C arriers (APC) delivered by the Soviet 
Union in M arch and  O ctober 1965 h ad  hard ly  
left the compound where they were unloaded due 
to a lack of spare parts. A nother 55 Chinese Jay  
Fong tru c k s  delivered suffered a sim ilar fate, 
w ith  over h a lf  of th em  u n se rv iceab le  u p o n  
delivery. However, despite these issues the point 
w as being m ade. C hina h ad  delivered in excess 
of $2 m illion in a sse ts  including m ateria l for 
hom e sta tion  developm ent a t bo th  Nachingwea 
and  Zanzibar. Chinese advisors were deploying 
w ith the  m ateria ls  to oversee the  work and  
con tinue  th e ir efforts in  p rom oting  an  a n ti­
w e ste rn  governm en t a n d  defence force. By 
contrast, w estern in terests had  delivered limited 
assis tance  and  more often th a n  no t had  tried to 
d issuade  T anzan ia  from  acqu iring  advanced 
w eapon system s. This diplom atic approach  had  
h ad  an  adverse effect on w estern  influence in 
the region.36
In  D e c e m b e r 1966  C o lonel P rice  w as 
informed by Brigadier Sarakikya th a t despite his 
own argum ents to the Tanzanian government the 
decision h a d  been  m ade by the  Second Vice- 
President to d ispatch  ten  officers and  sixty m en 
to C hina for tra in in g  on the  ta n k s  th a t  the  
Com m unists intended to supply.37 Soon after the 
Chinese deployed a  team  of approxim ately eight 
persons to Songea to tra in  reserve soldiers, and  
possib ly  a  second  g roup  to tra in  o th e rs  a t 
M usoma. Songea had  been chosen as the hom e 
sta tion  of the p lanned  6 th  Battalion TPDF, with 
the 7 th  B attalion  TPDF p lanned  for M usom a. 
The la tte r  s ta tio n  w as located not far from the 
Kiabakari Gold Mine, then  considered one of the 
country’s strategic asse ts .38
CAFATTT officers fo u n d  TPDF defence  
p la n n in g  in c re as in g ly  d ifficu lt a s  C h inese  
intervention expanded through  1966 and  1967. 
D e sp ite  r e g u la r  m e e tin g s  w ith  B rig a d ie r  
Sarakikya and  Mr. Kyesi, the Principle A ssistant 
S ecre tary  for the  M inistry of Defence, there  
seem ed to be no way to achieve a realistic defence 
plan or budget. Worse, there was no coordination 
betw een the Tanzanian  M inistry of Defence and  
i ts  M in is try  of E c o n o m ic  A ffa irs  a n d  
Development Planning. The existing defence plan 
h a d  called for £7-10  m illion a year while the 
T reasu ry  h ad  allo tted  only £3-5 million. The
sudden  desire to include the form ation of a  navy 
and  an  arm oured  u n it fu rth e r degraded the  
viability of the defence plan, and  the C anadians 
argued th a t there was little hope of establishing 
a  credible force if the T anzan ian  governm ent 
continued.39 Colonel Price p u t forth th a t priority 
for a  cap ab ility  h a d  to be b a se d  on need , 
availability of outside assistance, and  capability 
to recru it, tra in , equip, house , m ain ta in  th a t 
capability . He a lso  a rgued  th a t  n e ith e r  the  
in ternational situation  nor the national security 
s itu a tio n  a t th a t  tim e w arran ted  any so rt of 
a c c e le ra te d  b u ild  u p  of force. F inally , the  
CAFATTT chief engineer w arned th a t the terrain  
sim ply did n o t favour tan k s, as m ost roads in 
T anzan ia  were m etalled and  the  bridges were 
no t designed to su s ta in  any th ing  over tw enty- 
two to n n es .40 In end despite  all of the  advice 
CAFATTT offered, there  seem ed to be no way to 
deter the  governm ent from accepting  certa in  
Chinese p lans  over their own.
T ie  con tinuously  evolving secu rity  situa tion  in Tanzania had  serious effects on the ability 
of CAFATTT to c o n tin u e  w ith  its  p la n n e d  
operations th ro u g h o u t the next two years. A
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num ber of issues arose bo th  in  the international 
a rena  as well as a t hom e regarding the n a tu re  of 
the tra in ing  the  C anad ians  were providing and  
the extent to which they had  becom e involved in 
the  in te rn a l an d  ex ternal secu rity  m atte rs  of 
T a n z a n ia . F a r  from  sim ply  fo s te rin g  good 
international relations and  contributing to peace 
a n d  s ta b i l i ty ,  th e  CAFATTT fo u n d  i ts e lf  
increasingly embroiled in the com plicated game 
of Cold War chess being played ou t in  T anzania 
betw een them selves and  the com m unists.
In D ecem ber 1966 CAFATTT assis ted  in  the 
coord ination  of a n u m b er of in te rn a l security  
opera tio n s  th ro u g h o u t T an z an ia ’s s o u th e rn  
d is tr ic ts . In  one in s ta n c e  th e  m em b ers  of 
CAFATTT superv ised  an  airlift of tw enty  field 
force policem en from Moshi to Lake M anyara to 
in te rc e p t  a ra id  b e in g  c a rr ie d  o u t by  th e  
W am ang’ati tribe  ag a in st the  M asai tribe  in  
re ta lia tio n  for ca ttle  th e ft.41 L ater the  sam e 
m onth , CAFATTT assis ted  in  the  deploym ent of 
TPDF u n its  to villages along th e  T anzan ia - 
Mozambique border in response to the discovery 
of recently laid m ines in the M twara d istrict th a t 
h a d  killed a n d  w ounded  severa l c iv ilians.42 
A d d itio n a lly , CAFATTT re c o m m e n d e d  th e  
im m ediate building up  to s treng th  of the 3rd  Bn 
TPDF a t Nachingwea because of its proxim ity to 
the M ozambique border and  the possibility th a t 
there m ight be further incidents. The CDF agreed 
and  fu rther augm ented  the 3rd  Bn TPDF w ith a 
com pany from the  4 th  Bn TPDF th en  sta tioned  
on Pem ba.43
New evidence suggesting th a t  soldiers were 
b e in g  tr a in e d  in  T a n z a n ia  for f ig h tin g  in  
Mozambique and  Rhodesia was one explanation 
for the  increased  a ttack s  occurring  along its 
so u th e rn  border. CAFATTT h a d  su spec ted  th a t 
the Chinese advisors were training bo th  civilians 
an d  TPDF reserve soldiers for guerilla  w arfare, 
though  there  w as no clear evidence to suggest 
th a t  TPDF regu lars  were being u sed  for ra ids 
on  M ozam bique. Q u e s tio n s  w ere ra ise d  in  
O ttaw a by the S tand ing  Com m ittee on E xternal 
Affairs (SCEA) in  J u ly  1967 reg a rd in g  th is  
m atter, however the  U ndersecretary  of S tate  for 
E x ternal Affairs re a ssu re d  the  com m ittee th a t  
CAFATTT h ad  played no role in  tra in ing  raiders 
or freedom  fighters. This po in t w as reinforced 
during Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa s 
visit to O ttaw a on Ju ly  19th, 1967, w hen he
categorically denied th a t freedom  fighters were 
being tra in ed  by the  TPDF or by CAFATTT.44
Despite such  reassu rances there was clearly 
evidence to suggest th a t  soldiers belonging to 
the  F ron t for the  L iberation of M ozam bique 
(FRELIMO) were b ased  in an d  operating  from 
T anzania. While the  governm ent declared they 
were n o t tra in in g  an d  sup p o rtin g  FRELIMO 
u n its , they also s ta te d  th a t  T anzan ia  m ade no 
sa n c tio n  a g a in s t FRELIMO e q u ip m en t an d  
supplies entering their ports or passing  through 
th e ir  coun try . More in te resting ly , the  m ost 
obvious clue to suggest T anzanian collaboration 
could be found right a t DFHQ in D ar es Salaam . 
C a p ta in  A. C. Diallo, a lia ison  officer from  
FRELIMO, h a d  a n  office a t  DFHQ an d  w as 
designated  as  a  staff officer (supply) on the 
D FQ H  o r g a n iz a t io n  c h a r t .  H is  m a in  
responsib ilities included  the  m anagem en t of 
supp lies en tering  T anzan ia  and  destined  for 
FRELIMO bases, and  he often accom panied Mr. 
Mgonja, the  T anzan ian  M inister for S ta te  for 
Foreign Affairs, to sessions of the  Coordination 
Com m ittee for the  L iberation of Africa. W hen 
approached  on the  issue, Brigadier S arak ikya 
s ta te d  th a t  the  TPDF w as rep resen ted  a t su c h  
comm ittees simply to be completely familiar with 
FRELIMO’s p lans and  to ensu re  th a t  there  is no 
th rea t to Tanzanian security. Arguably there was 
a m ore im portan t desire to re ta in  control of the 
various organizations operating out of Tanzania s 
borders, as any action  by these  g roups could 
invite  a n  a rm ed  re sp o n se  by M ozam bique, 
Rhodesia, an d  even S ou th  Africa.45
In re tu rn in g  accusations of collaboration, a 
u n k n o w n  so u rc e  d is tr ib u te d  p a m p h le ts  to 
T anzan ian  officer cadets tra in ing  in  C anada  in 
M arch 1968 suggesting th a t South African agents 
were posing as instructo rs on both  their courses 
and  the  CAFATTT to ga ther intelligence and  
m o n ito r  FRELIMO a c tiv itie s . T h o u g h  th e  
accusation was unfounded, it certainly w ounded 
the reputation of the C anadians in Tanzania who 
had  up  to th a t point escaped any serious political 
sc ru tiny  from  their h o s ts .46
More d isturb ing  incidents occurred tow ards 
the  end of the year. In November 1967 the  a n ti­
ta n k  section  an d  m ach inegun  section from  the 
3rd  TPDF Bn a t Nachingwea were d ispatched  to 
M bam ba Bay on Lake N yasa in  response  to an
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inciden t along the so u th e rn  border. A m onth  
l a t e r  a  r e p o r t  a r r iv e d  o n  th e  CAFATTT 
com m ander’s desk  a t DFHQ suggesting  th a t  
th ese  u n its  m ay have a ss is te d  FRELIMO in 
s in k in g  two sm all P o rtu g u ese  g u n b o a ts  off 
Cobue, over a  h u n d re d  k ilom eters so u th  of 
M bam ba Bay on Lake N yasa an d  well inside 
M ozam bique territo ry .47 S u c h  in c id en ts  did 
m uch to destabilize the region and  invited arm ed 
r e t a l i a t i o n  fro m  b o th  R h o d e s ia  a n d  
M ozambique. S ou th  Africa also declared th a t  it 
w ould come to the  assis tan ce  of e ither country  
in  th e  even t of a n  a tta c k . P o rtu g u ese  a n d  
R h o d e s ia n  a i r c r a f t  f r e q u e n t ly  flew  in to  
T anzanian airspace to drop political leaflets and 
occasionally  to engage su sp ec te d  FRELIMO 
targets. In response, T anzan ia  considered  its 
options for a ir defence and  a m ore offensive air 
p o w e r c a p a b i l i ty  b e y o n d  th e  tu rb o -p ro p  
tran sp o rt aircraft th a t C anada h a d  supplied.
The MIG Issue
In  re s p o n s e  to  th e  g ro w in g  c o n c e rn  of reta lia to ry  a ir and  ground  a tta ck s  aga inst 
T a n z a n ia  by  i ts  n e ig h b o u r in g  c o u n tr ie s ,  
P residen t Nyerere d ispa tched  a team  of sen ior 
s ta ff to Moscow in May 1968 to explore the 
possibility of acquiring MIG aircraft, rad a r  field 
guns, and  air defence sy stem s.48 W ashington 
im m ediately responded  to th is  action  w ith a 
series of political an d  diplom atic m anoeuvres, 
in c lu d in g  a  re q u e s t  to  O ttaw a  to  in s t r u c t  
CAFATTT to sub tly  d iscourage the  TPDF from 
seeking fighter an d  m issile acqu isition  a t th a t  
tim e. W ashington w as extrem ely  concerned  
a b o u t the  possib ility  of e ith e r T an z an ia  or 
Zam bia p u rch as in g  su c h  hardw are, indicating 
th a t  a regional a rm s race m ight e n su e  an d  
generally destab ilise  the  region fu rth e r.49 More 
likely the  A m ericans were concerned th a t  the 
arrival of MIG fighters in S ou thern  Africa would 
also invite increased  Soviet influence in the 
region. Not only would such  a deal require a large 
contingent of Soviet advisors and  technical staff 
in Tanzania, th u s  radically tipping the scales in 
their favour, the ir generosity  could potentially  
re su lt in open airfields in S o u th ern  Africa for 
Soviet u se  in tim e of war.
Colonel Sheffield, who h ad  replaced Colonel 
P rice  a s  c o m m a n d e r  of CAFATTT a t  th e  
expiration of the la tte r’s to u r duty, approached
B rigadier S arak ikya  on the  issu e  of fighters 
u n d e r the  guise of its po ten tia l im pact on the 
existing Canadian training program. He m anaged 
to su b tly  advance A m erican concerns w ithout 
appearing overbearing and  the CDF left Colonel 
Sheffield with the im pression th a t he h ad  taken  
the C anadian advice seriously.50 However, it was 
clear th a t  T an zan ia ’s governm ent in tended  to 
p u rsu e  th e  m a tte r  fu rth e r, an d  once again  
C anada found itself in  the  m iddle of a  gam e of 
Cold War chess.
The MIG issue  rem ained  com plicated for all 
parties. There were a n u m b er of factors th a t 
w eighed ag a in s t the  possib ility  of T an zan ia  
acquiring  MIG aircraft including  the  fact th a t 
Tanzanian-Soviet relations were generally poor. 
The R ussians h ad  h ad  little success in  the  p a s t 
in  convincing Ju liu s  Nyerere to accept Soviet 
equ ipm ent an d  advisors, an d  the  Soviet MIG 
fighter su p p o rt to Nigeria in  th e ir w ar aga in st 
the B iafrans h ad  greatly  d istu rb ed  Tanzania, 
w hich favoured the la tte r  group in the  conflict. 
As well, due to B ritish  influence in  bo th  the 
Z am bian  an d  K enyan m ilitaries they  tended  to 
ad v ise  T a n z a n ia  a g a in s t  p u r s u in g  S ov ie t 
assistance. Finally the shear cost of m aintaining 
soph istica ted  a ircraft w as sim ply beyond the 
cu rren t T anzan ian  defence budget.51
By the end of May 1968 it appeared  th a t the 
g o v e rn m e n t  h a d  d e c id e d  to  p u r s u e  th e  
possibility  of acquiring  bo th  MIG fighters and  
an  air defence system  though no clear indication 
w as given of how the  T anzan ians  p lanned  to 
proceed . The CAFATTT d isp a tch ed  valuab le  
m essages on the MIG issue  to O ttaw a on a daily 
b asis , allowing the  decision m akers in O ttaw a 
to keep W ashington well informed of the situation 
on the ground while assessing C anada’s own next 
moves. W hen it was realised tha t the TPDF would 
en co u n te r serious difficulties in  estab lish ing  a 
figh ter a ir  w ing, Colonel Sheffield w ith  the  
p e rm iss io n  of O ttaw a  once  a g a in  s te p p e d  
forw ard to offer C anad ian  assis tan ce  on the 
m atter. Every opportun ity  to re ta in  influence 
over the  TPDF w as seized, an d  in  th is  case 
C anada h ad  the additional advantage of already 
having significant influence over T anzan ia’s air 
power developm ent. Still, it w as unknow n if 
C anada could succeed  in stifling the R ussian  
offer as it h a d  lost considerable influence w ith 
the TPDF over the  la s t year while the  C hinese 
h a d  gained  m uch  political g round. By 1968
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Chinese influence had  certainly become a factor 
in every m ajor defence decision now being taken  
by the T anzanian  governm ent.
Ending the Program
By M arch 1968 the D epartm en t of National Defence h a d  expended a lm ost $7.5  m illion 
in m ilitary assistance to Tanzania, spending well 
beyond its original proposed  budget of $4.54 
million for the  entire  five-year program . Like all 
p ro g ram s w ith o u t a p rec e d e n t th e  orig inal 
budget was grossly underestim ated, and  did not 
account for unexpected equipm ent costs and  the 
need  for ex tra  supp lies an d  staff. The addition  
of the  Air Wing in 1965 greatly added  to the 
im m ed ia te  c o s ts  of th e  m iss io n , a lth o u g h  
approxim ately $ 10.5 million h a d  been  se t aside 
for its estab lishm ent and  m aintenance. A review 
of the costs for the program  identified th a t there 
w as  li t t le  p o s s ib ili ty  of r e d u c in g  c u r r e n t  
expenditures w ithout significantly depleting the 
C anad ian  p resence in  the  country , an d  there  
rem a in e d  severa l ta s k s  th a t  h a d  yet to be 
accom plished.52 A particu lar point of contention 
w ith the  T anzan ian  governm ent was the failure 
th u s  far on the  p a rt of C anada  to com plete the 
construction  of the m ilitary academ y. Although 
the  s ite  su rvey  w as com pleted  in  1967 the  
b u ild ing  h a d  yet to be co n s tru c te d , m ain ly  
because the original training budget of $700,000 
a n n u a l ly  h a d  in c lu d e d  th e  c o s t  o f th e  
construc tion  of the TMA and  the CAFATTT was 
spend ing  over $1 m illion a year on tra in ing . It 
w as th en  doubtfu l th a t  by m id -1968 C abinet 
w ould have approved additional funds for the 
arm y project an d  given th a t  the  program  w as 
schedu led  to term inate  in  approxim ately  two 
years it seem ed unlikely th a t the TMA would ever 
be bu ilt.53
Moreover, by Ju ly  1968 the  CAFATTT was 
c le a rly  lo s in g  g ro u n d  to  th e  C o m m u n is t  
competition. Second Vice-President Kawawa had 
in v ited  a tea m  of Soviet se n io r  officers to 
T anzan ia  in  Ju n e  to advise on th e ir a ir defence 
req u irem en ts  an d  m ade no effort to inform  
Colonel Sheffield of their visit. T hen  in  Ju ly  Mr. 
Kawawa m ade a n u m b er of com m ents to the 
p ress  regard ing  h is  general d isp leasu re  w ith 
C anad ian  a ssis tan ce  to date, detailing the lack 
of progress on the TMA and the failure to provide
T anzania  w ith a m ore soph isticated  (fighter jet) 
a ir force. By con trast, the Soviets h a d  offered a 
squ ad ro n  of MIG-2 I s  and  th ree  sq u ad ro n s of 
M IG-15s, a gift th a t  C anada  sim ply could no t 
m atch. Additionally, while the  CDF h a d  argued 
t h a t  CA FATTT's t r a in in g  s t a n d a r d s  fa r  
superceded  those of the C hinese, C ubans, or 
Russians, it was becoming painfully obvious th a t 
C anada’s connection to NATO and  the west was 
tak ing  its toll on their welcome in country.
In early O ctober a  ‘gift’ of 14 C hinese tan k s  
arrived a t D ar es Salaam  signalling yet ano ther 
move by the  co m m u n is ts  to gain  favour in 
T anzania. S ta tioned  a t Lugalo ju s t  ou tside the 
city, Colonel Sheffield h a d  offered C anad ian  
assistance in developing the un it b u t was politely 
refu sed  by the  CDF who told h im  th a t  the  
C anad ians were no t invited to participate in  the 
form ation of the  TPDF T ank  Com pany. It was 
the first tim e th a t CAFATTT was not responsible 
for training a part of the army, and  although they 
h ad  access to the  T ank  Com pany com m ander 
a t DFHQ, they  were no t allowed to visit the u n it 
hom e sta tion  or facilities.54 CAFATTT could only 
m ake a note to O ttaw a th a t  the TPDF w as no t 
expected to receive any operational tan k  training 
from C hinese advisors b u t sim ply m ain tenance 
an d  repa ir sk ills.55
In 1969 CAFATTT began p rep ara tio n s  for 
the  possible term ination  of its m andate  in  the 
following year. C a n a d a  w as still u n c e r ta in  
w hether they  would be requested  to ex tend  the 
CAFATTT beyond 1970, th o u g h  the  general 
feeling in  O ttaw a was th a t  it seem ed very likely 
given the  great deal of work to be done. D espite 
the  growing p resence of C hina an d  the  recen t 
a n im o s ity  d isp la y e d  by  th e  S e c o n d  Vice 
President, Mr. Kawawa, CAFATTT rem ained very 
influential in Tanzania’s military affairs and  both 
th e  CDF a n d  th e  P re s id e n t s till fav o u re d  
CAFATTT’s presence. However, early in  the year 
the newly appointed m inister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. M hando, delivered a  m essage on 
behalf of Mr. Kawawa indicating  th a t  T anzania  
was extremely satisfied w ith the assistance from 
C a n a d a  a n d  th a t  CAFATTT h a d  b e e n  so 
successfu l th a t  it could term inate  on schedu le  
in  Ja n u a ry  1970. Kawawa asked the air wing to 
rem ain  an d  a ss is t w ith the  developm ent of a 
sep ara te  m ilitary a ir force, b u t  the  CAFATTT 
arm y program  w as officially over.56
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The m essage cam e as bo th  a su rp rise  and  a 
relief. O ttaw a w as d e lig h ted  to  le a rn  th a t  
T anzan ia  h ad  chosen  no t to p u rsu e  the  MIG 
option, however they were surprised to learn tha t 
the Army training program  was to be term inated. 
Colonel Sheffield h a d  con tinued  to partic ipa te  
in TPDF defence planning th roughout 1969 and 
it was obvious th a t the arm y would need a t least 
an o th e r five years of external a ssis tan ce  before 
a tta in in g  any degree of self-sufficiency. It was 
expected tha t the TPDF would continue to receive 
external assistance solely from China. For all its 
efforts on the ground, C anada had  lost the larger 
political gam e.57
It was later learned th a t the Tanzanians had  
given considerable th o ugh t to the  decision to 
term ina te  C an ad a ’s arm y assis tance . F irst, by 
far the  m ajo rity  of the  TPDF w eapons an d  
equ ipm ent were of C hinese origin an d  it m ade 
little sense to employ Canadian instructors when 
the  C hinese were willing to provide the  sam e 
train ing. As well, C hina h ad  clearly s ta ted  its 
opposition to CAFATTT’s advisory role w hen it 
w as supplying the  m ajority  of w eapons, and  
w anted a greater influence in TPDF development 
if it w as going to con tinue its role as provider. 
Tanzania felt confident th a t it could now m anage 
th e  TPD F on  i ts  ow n w i th o u t  CAFATTT 
assistance  and  their departu re  would elim inate 
the  w eapons - advisory conflict. Second, there  
was an  immediate need to integrate the Zanzibar 
an d  m ain land  elem ents of the  TPDF an d  it was 
clear th a t  C an ad a’s p resence a t DFHQ and  the 
TMA w as h indering  th a t  in tegration . Again the 
m ajority  of Zanzibar an d  Pem ba’s officer corps 
h a d  been  tra in ed  by e a s te rn  pow ers an d  it 
seem ed easier to remove CAFATTT th an  to foster 
in ternal political anim osity. Finally, the issue of 
the  TMA itself h a d  becom e a sore spot w ith the 
T a n z an ia n  governm en t for som e tim e. The 
construc tion  h a d  still no t s ta r te d  by 1969 and  
it becam e questionable if the project would ever 
be completed. Both the M inistry of Defence and  
w ith TPDF officials believed th a t  C anada had  
never in tended  to bu ild  the  facility a t all, and  
unfortunately CAFATTT could offer little defence. 
The TMA had  been  a  m ission  failure.58
In May 1969 a n u m b er of C hinese advisors 
arrived at D ar es Salaam  to begin train ing TPDF 
u n its . Again Colonel Sheffield h a d  n o t been  
in fo rm e d  of th e  a rr iv a l, th o u g h  th e  CDF 
m entioned it to him  after a photo had  appeared
in the local p ress .59 While their arrival w as not a 
surprise, it clearly indicated the beginning of the 
end for CAFATTT. Over the next few m onths the 
C a n a d ia n s  e x tr ica ted  th em se lv es  from  the  
various u n its  an d  b ases  and  p repared  for their 
r e tu rn  to C a n a d a . M eanw hile th e  C h inese  
fo cu sed  on  tu rn in g  th e  TPDF in to  a m ore 
rev o lu tio n a ry  a rm y  to  figh t th e  E u ro p e a n  
presence in  S ou thern  Africa and  there  was little 
CAFATTT could do to stop it. By December 1969 
CAFATTT h ad  ceased  operations an d  the las t 
arm y advisors re tu rn ed  to C anada in  J a n u a ry  
1970. The air wing team  followed soon after.
Conclusion
Overall the Canadian mission to Tanzania had been  a  success. In a little m ore th a n  five 
years the C anadian  Armed Forces h ad  tu rn e d  a 
m utin ied  rabble  into som eth ing  resem bling a 
professional army, had  linked the m ainland with 
its islands by air, an d  h a d  form ed the  nu c leu s  
of a m odern  air force. The construc tion  of the 
TMA h a d  b een  a failu re , yet CAFATTT h ad  
estab lished  a se lf-susta in ing  tra in ing  program  
w ithout any facilities and  very lim ited support. 
O ther th an  the TMA all objectives had  been met. 
For DND the  CAFATTT m arked  yet a n o th e r  
re m a rk a b le  a c h ie v e m e n t th a t  d e fin ed  th e  
professionalism  of the  C anad ian  Arm ed Forces 
even while in  the  th roes of reorgan isa tion  a t 
home.
Last, a lthough  the C om m unists h ad  clearly 
prevailed in  the  Cold War ba ttle  for influence, 
C anadian-Tanzanian relations were not harm ed 
by the term ination  of CAFATTT. In fact, some in 
DEA observed  th e  en d in g  as  a b le ss in g  in  
disguise. Both D epartm en t of E xternal Affairs 
an d  DND realised  th a t  C an ad a’s p resence in 
T anzania a ttrac ted  suspicion from the east th a t 
sa w  th e m  a s  s p ie s  for W a sh in g to n . T h is  
accusation held some tru th , for CAFATTT clearly 
collaborated with w estern in terests on a num ber 
of stra teg ic  issu es , an d  it w ould have been  
difficult to p u rsu e  a  foreign policy of m oderate 
m iddle pow er u n d e r su c h  c ircum stances. As 
well, g iven th e  very likely  p o ss ib ility  th a t  
Tanzania was going to continue its active though 
indirect suppo rt of liberation forces, CAFATTT’s 
role as advisor to the  TPDF m ay have created  
possib le fu tu re  political difficulties for O ttaw a 
a n d  m aybe  even  s e r io u s  e m b a r ra s s m e n t .
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C anada  w as, after all, a m em ber of bo th  NATO 
and  the Com m onwealth.
F inally , CAFATTT serves a n  in te re s tin g  
rem inder of w hat w as once easily w ith in  the 
capabilities of DND. The operational atrophy tha t 
followed the unification of the  forces in  1967 
depleted any possibility of carrying out similarly 
independen t m issions for two decades. In 1996 
C an ad a  m ade a n  a tte m p t to in d ep en d en tly  
deploy a force to cen tral so u th e rn  Africa only to 
fail for a m iserable lack of strategic intelligence, 
lift, and  com bat service support. The force th a t 
actually  arrived in  th ea tre  w as a m ere shadow  
of the  p resence  th a t  DND h a d  m ade in  Africa 
th ree  decades before, an d  C anada  h a s  yet to 
revive DND to the point where it could undertake 
such  m issions w ithout serious difficulty. For the 
p resen t, C anada  rem ains on the  periphery  of 
capably supplying assis tance  to the  developing 
world in  Africa.
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